Book Note | Augustine and the Dialogue

Erik Kenyon. Augustine and the Dialogue. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 2018.

In Augustine and the Dialogue, Erik Kenyon argues that whereas “the scholarly community has come to view Augustine’s dialogues as juvenilia” that “in general fail to attain any substantial literary or philosophical coherence,” a more holistic reading uncovers “rich resources for contemporary debates on pedagogy, virtue theory, skepticism as a way of life and rational approaches to religion” (p. 2-3; cf. p.160). Kenyon’s contribution to the field of Augustinian studies is thus twofold, providing both a reading of the dialogues that asks the field to reconsider them afresh while simultaneously advocating that Augustine’s corpus makes an important contribution to the history of virtue ethics.

The content and quality of Augustine’s dialogues, according to Kenyon, have been underappreciated for three key reasons. Firstly, debates around their historicity have often limited scholars’ attention to questions of veracity and chronology (p. 3-4). A second debate has centered on Augustine’s relationship to strands of Platonic thought. Representatives of these debates include Peter Brown’s landmark work, Augustine of Hippo: A Biography (2000) where he argued for a “developmentalist reading” as well as Carol Harrison’s Rethinking Augustine’s Early Theology (2006) which advanced a “Unitarian reading” (p. 5). Finally, Kenyon notes a tendency among scholars to focus narrowly on specific philosophical questions, such as the antiskeptical arguments of Contra academicos (p. 6). These scholarly trends have resulted in a fragmented presentation of Augustine’s dialogues. Kenyon proposes a holistic, expansive reading as the best way to account for the richness of these compositions. This approach follows trajectories outlined in Brian Stock’s Augustine’s Inner Dialogue (2010), as well as Ryan Topping’s emphasis on the relationship between Augustine’s pedagogical theory and moral thought.[1] Drawing on literary theory, Kenyon explores the dialogues with an eye to their pedagogical features, allowing the dialogues to be read “on their own terms” (p. 9). Accordingly, each of the book’s chapters is devoted to the examination of Augustine’s dialogues, chapters one through four examining the Cassiciacum dialogues, Contra academicos, De beata vita, and De ordine (together with De musica), while chapters five through seven are devoted to Soliloquia together with De immortalitate animae, De quantitate animae, and De libero arbitrio, respectively.

Kenyon presents each dialogue as comprised of “three stages: (A) aporetic debate, (R) reflection on the act of debating, and (P) the revelation of a final plausible conclusion” (p. 12-13). According to this three-fold schema he dubs “ARP”, Kenyon demonstrates how this approach uncovers the multiple layers at work in each dialogue. The presence of aporetic debate and self-reflection underscores the Stoic psychological underpinnings of Augustine’s dialogues (p. 47). Kenyon explains that the first step of “aporetic debates help us identify and articulate problematic impressions, born of everyday experience and give us good reason to withhold or, more precisely, withdraw our assent to them.” Then, the following step of “reflection on our rational activities supplies us with new impressions and gives us reason to assent to them” (p. 47). At play in the dialogues, then, is a process of unlearning to prepare for new learning (p. 49, 108, and 177). In this Augustine’s pedagogical method has much in common with pedagogical philosophies currently being developed by the Philosophy for Kids Movement, which highlights our natural inquisitiveness as human persons (p. 234). Based on his own time in the college classroom, Kenyon argues that this characteristic ought to be intentionally cultivated in students especially as they enter college. Kenyon explains that “in practical terms, this means encouraging students to admit confusion and helping them develop skills in framing questions” (p. 234; cf. p. 235). It is worth adding that this dynamic has also been demonstrated by neuroscientific studies which Nancy Michael and Ben Wilson have brought into conversation with theology to explore how this dynamic works so as to bring about a new worldview, which Kenyon argues is Augustine’s aim in the dialogues (p. 47).[2]

The analysis of Augustine’s dialogues is done hand in hand with the examination of Augustine’s theory of virtue. Kenyon argues that Augustine’s dialogues contribute to contemporary discussions of virtue theory as “the fusion of Classical and Christian virtue presented…goes beyond the Aristotelian preoccupations that tend to dominate current discussions of virtue theory and deserves attention in its own right” (p. 21). More specifically, Kenyon argues that Augustine’s approach contributes to the discussion in two ways. Whereas for Aristotle habituation must begin at a young age if the excellence of virtue is to be attained, Augustine shows himself to be much more optimistic in the development of virtue at any age in life through the use of the ARP method (p. 166-167). Kenyon demonstrates that the ARP is undergirded by the familiar dictum, “faith seeking understanding” (p. 16 and 21-22), and how Augustine’s method lies in a close reading of the scriptural text (168). Connecting Augustine’s reliance on Scripture and his theory of virtue, Kenyon observes that the dialogues “use scriptural cues” to explore various virtues (p. 160).

The several chapters of the text explore Augustine’s dialogues by applying the methodology just described. Thus, for example, in the first three dialogues analyzed by Kenyon, the scriptural cues come from the triad of measure, number, and weight from the Book of Wisdom 11:20, which reads, “you have arranged all things by measure and number and weight.” Accordingly, in Contra academicos (Chs. 1-2) the tandem of faith and reason is described as the weight that carries the individual in the pursuit of wisdom (p. 52 and 55), in De beata vita (Ch. 3) moderation is a virtue key to the individual’s conformation to Christ as the measure of the soul (p. 98), and in De ordine (Ch. 4) justice is the virtue that enables life in accordance with the number “in the structuring of the world and the world’s invitations to seek Unity as what grounds its goodness for human beings” (p. 121). Chapter 5 argues that this same methodology is at work in Soliloquia if it is read together with De immortalitate animae. When read in this way, Kenyon argues that the works are structured according to the theological virtues of faith, hope, and charity from 1 Corinthians 13:13 paired with an overarching focus on the moral virtue of courage (p. 20). Chapter 6 explores De quantitate animae, which Kenyon sees as presenting a “synoptic” view of Augustine’s theory of virtue (p. 160). Put simply, following Platonic theory, Augustine understands virtue to come in graded forms which fall roughly into the categories of civic virtue, kathartic or purifying virtue, and contemplative virtues (p. 161). For Kenyon, this is the second way Augustine’s approach contributes to the field of virtue theory, arguing that whereas Aristotle struggles to state whether virtue exists in the various parts of the soul or only in its rational faculty, Augustine presents a spectrum of virtues ranging from civic to contemplative, “while kathartic virtue bridges the gap” (p. 166). The movement from civic to contemplative virtue detailed in his examination of De quantitate animae provides a bridge to Kenyon’s discussion of De libero arbitrio in the final chapter of the book. Kenyon argues that when read holistically, De libero arbitrio is seen to be an exploration of life’s big questions driven by the virtue of piety, which enables individuals to think of God “in the highest terms possible” while taking “responsibility for their own shortcomings” (p. 22).

The lesson learned in De libero arbitrio forms the main component of the pedagogical contribution Kenyon believes Augustine’s dialogues make. He illuminates how Augustine’s dialogues ask those engaged in dialogue both to keep an open mind and also to attend to their own positions and those of others carefully. Through dialogue, Augustine leads students through a process of ascetic discipline driven by intellectual humility in order to pursue the virtuous life in community (p. 189 and 228-229), each dialogue aiming at one or more specific virtues. Reading Augustine’s dialogues today, we may reflect on how to better engage one another in ways that recognize deeply-held beliefs while offering avenues for achieving mutual understanding (p. 236). Ultimately, Kenyon’s contribution is threefold, providing significant insights in the study of Augustine’s dialogues, virtue ethics, and pedagogical method for the university setting today.

Anthony Crescio is a third year PhD student in Christian Theology at Saint Louis University. His research pursues the “ressourcement” of patristic understandings of virtue, and explores the intersection of moral, sacramental and liturgical theology.